Turkish Journal of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences
Volume 25

Number 6

Article 23

1-1-2017

Neoteric chaff generation method of fingerprint fuzzy vault
NANCY SINGLA
SANJEEV SOFAT
MANVJEET KAUR

Follow this and additional works at: https://journals.tubitak.gov.tr/elektrik
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, Computer Sciences Commons, and the Electrical and
Computer Engineering Commons

Recommended Citation
SINGLA, NANCY; SOFAT, SANJEEV; and KAUR, MANVJEET (2017) "Neoteric chaff generation method of
fingerprint fuzzy vault," Turkish Journal of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences: Vol. 25: No. 6,
Article 23. https://doi.org/10.3906/elk-1609-258
Available at: https://journals.tubitak.gov.tr/elektrik/vol25/iss6/23

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TÜBİTAK Academic Journals. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Turkish Journal of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences by an authorized editor of TÜBİTAK
Academic Journals. For more information, please contact academic.publications@tubitak.gov.tr.

Turkish Journal of Electrical Engineering & Computer Sciences
http://journals.tubitak.gov.tr/elektrik/

Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci
(2017) 25: 4722 – 4733
c TÜBİTAK
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Abstract: Authentication using biometrics has an edge over traditional authentication mechanisms. Fuzzy vault is an
eminent biometric cryptosystem technique that aims to protect a secret using a biometric template. Authorized users
can, however, access the secret by providing the valid biometric. In a fuzzy vault, noise is incorporated in the form
of chaﬀ points in order to increase the security. While implementing fuzzy vault schemes in real scenarios, the most
critical but computing-intensive and time-consuming task is chaﬀ generation. In this paper, a neoteric method for chaﬀ
generation is proposed, which is less time-consuming in generating large numbers of chaﬀ points.
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1. Introduction
In today’s world, the authentication and verification of a person is of more concern. As the level of security
breaches increases, biometric technologies are becoming a base in providing large numbers of highly secure
solutions for identification and personal verification. Biometrics refers to the automatic recognition of individuals based on their physiological and/or behavioral characteristics [1]. A biometric system is defined as a
technological system that uses unique biological traits to identify an individual. During the recognition process
in a biometric system, first the user presents the biometric trait and the biometric sample is obtained by the
sensor. Then a feature vector (template) is formed, which is obtained by grouping the quantified characteristic
parameter of the sample. The template is then matched against other templates stored in the database that
correspond to the individual whose identity is claimed and, depending upon the level of similarity, a score is
generated. Finally, based on the generated score, the biometric system makes a decision about whether to
accept the sample as a genuine user or to reject it as imposter.
Biometric systems have enhanced the security level but are also vulnerable to various types of attacks
[2]. Attack on the biometric template stored in the system database is one of the most potentially damaging
attacks for biometric systems [3]. It becomes diﬃcult to revoke the compromised template as biometric traits
are immutable in nature. Therefore, it is very important to secure the biometric template in any biometric
based authentication system.
Fuzzy vault is considered as a popular method for biometric template protection. It is a key binding
crypto-biometric system in which fuzzy unordered sets of genuine and chaﬀ points are used to encrypt and
decrypt the secret information securely [4,5]. The process of locking and unlocking the fuzzy vault is illustrated
in Figure 1 and described below.
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Figure 1. a) Locking fuzzy vault, b) unlocking fuzzy vault.

• Locking/encoding fuzzy vault: An unordered set of points called genuine points from the enrolling
biometric sample are extracted. A randomly chosen secret key is divided into (n + 1) equal parts and
an n-degree polynomial is constructed with its coeﬃcient from the secret key. Considering that only the
genuine minutiae points will satisfy the polynomial, a large number of random points called chaﬀ points,
which do not lie on that polynomial, are generated. The union of the genuine point and chaﬀ point sets
forms the fuzzy vault.
• Unlocking/decoding fuzzy vault: An unordered set of points from the query template is extracted and
used to unlock a secret key. A polynomial can be reconstructed if there is substantial overlap between the
enrolled and query unordered set of points and thus the secret key can be decoded securely using an error
correction scheme (Lagrange interpolation).
The security of the fuzzy vault depends on the intricacy of the polynomial reconstruction and the number of
generated chaﬀ points. Generally, the number of chaﬀ points generated is approximately ten times the genuine
minutiae points due to the tradeoﬀ between the computational complexity of the brute force attack and storage
requirements of the vault [6,7]. In real-time applications, the captured fingerprint image is of good quality when
it is acquired in a controlled environment. More than 20 quality minutiae points can be easily extracted from
such fingerprint samples. Therefore, the generally needed chaﬀ points are considered as more than 200.
Addition of chaﬀ points during the locking phase of fuzzy vault aims to produce random noise in order
to hide the genuine points from the attacker and thus enhance the security of the fuzzy vault. Generating chaﬀ
points in a fingerprint-based fuzzy vault is considered as the most computationally intensive task as compared
to other processes in fuzzy vault as it consumes 42.5% of the total execution time of the fuzzy vault locking [8].
There is a need to develop a fast chaﬀ generation algorithm. Even a small amount of reduction in execution time
can make a significant diﬀerence while implementing the fuzzy vault system in real-time scenarios that involve
dealing with huge datasets. In this paper, a chaﬀ point generation algorithm for a fingerprint-based fuzzy vault
is proposed, which is faster than existing chaﬀ point generation algorithms for generating the required number
of chaﬀ points.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the review of the related work
in the concerned field. Section 3 describes the proposed chaﬀ generation algorithm. In Section 4, results and
analysis are discussed. Finally, in Section 5, a conclusion is drawn.
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2. Related work
Fingerprints are considered as the most suitable modality for fuzzy vault schemes because the minutiae set is
an unordered set, which is the basic requirement for fuzzy vault schemes [4].
In the literature, much research has been done on fingerprint fuzzy vaults by various pioneering researchers. Implementation of a fingerprint fuzzy vault with minutiae descriptors containing information about
orientation and ridge frequency was presented in [9]. Yang and Verbauwhede [10] proposed an automatic
alignment using reference minutiae extracted during the vault encoding and decoding. Fingerprint alignment
based on helper data using the iterative closest point algorithm was proposed in [11,12]. Moon et al. [13]
proposed a geometric hashing technique to perform alignment in a minutiae-based fingerprint fuzzy vault. An
improved fuzzy vault was proposed in [14] by integrating information about the local ridge orientation of minutiae. An alignment-free fingerprint cryptosystem based on a fuzzy vault scheme was proposed in [15] by fusing
the transformation invariant local features (minutiae descriptors, minutiae local structure) of fingerprints. A
hashed fingerprint fuzzy vault was proposed and implemented in [16] to defy correlation attacks on fuzzy vaults.
Benhammadi and Bey [17] proposed a password-hardened fingerprint vault in order to provide diversity and
security for fingerprint minutiae templates during storage and comparison. The authors implemented a hybrid
approach by combining a user-generated password fuzzy vault with the transformed minutiae pairwise features.
A Hadamard-based fingerprint fuzzy vault was proposed by Bansal et al. to provide revocability and diversity
[18]. Genuine minutiae points are transformed using Hadamard transformation. Nguyen et al. proposed a fuzzy
vault for distorted fingerprint images using the information of ridge features as they are invariant to geometrical
transformations [19].
Fingerprint fuzzy vaults use the chaﬀ points to enhance the security by concealing the genuine minutiae
points amidst the chaﬀ points. In the literature, several methods for generating and placing chaﬀ points have
been proposed by various authors.
Clancy et al. [5] proposed a fingerprint fuzzy vault by using multiple minutiae locations as a locking
set. The Euclidean distance method was used to generate chaﬀ points, which should be placed at an acceptable
(threshold) distance from the genuine minutiae points. The complexity of generating the chaﬀ points was O(n3 ).
Clancy’s method of generating chaﬀ points was also used by Uludag et al. [9] and Nandakumar et al. [12].
A chaﬀ point placement method was proposed in [20] to prevent some inferences about the location of
genuine points. Apart from considering the Euclidean distance between chaﬀ points and genuine points, the
authors also considered interchaﬀ distance. In order to reduce the success rate of the attacker, a fake polynomial
is embedded in the fuzzy vault along with the secret polynomial.
A fast chaﬀ-generating algorithm was proposed by Khalil-Hani et al. [8,21] based on the algorithm
described in [5]. The authors used the mathematical theorem of circle packing. In the fuzzy vault set, a
new point is added only if the boundaries of two existing points do not overlap with each other. It uses only
addition, subtraction, and comparison operations and hence is less computationally intensive with computational
complexity of O(n2 ) as compared to [5]. However, it takes more computation time while generating chaﬀ points
greater than 200.
A less time-consuming chaﬀ point generation technique was proposed by Nguyen et al. [6,22] for producing
more than 200 chaﬀ points. The authors created image cells by splitting the fingerprint image into segments
and each image cell was surrounded by eight adjacent image cells. The randomly generated candidate chaﬀ
point is considered as the chaﬀ point if no other point lies inside the image cell in which the candidate chaﬀ
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point is generated and the distance between candidate chaﬀ points and the points in the adjacent eight image
cells is more than the threshold.
A chaﬀ generation algorithm that uses axis diﬀerence instead of Euclidean distance was proposed by
Hooda and Kaur [23]. It is faster as compared to [5] as simple arithmetic operators like addition and subtraction
are used.
Nguyen et al. [24] proposed a modified chaﬀ point generator in which chaﬀ points are generated
using continuous hashing and linear projection. Blend substitution attack can be prevented by detecting any
modification done to the original vault as chaﬀ points are considered as signatures for the combination of the
biometric template and secure key.
3. Proposed chaﬀ generation algorithm
The proposed chaﬀ generation algorithm modifies Nguyen’s chaﬀ generation algorithm [6,22] so that it takes a
consistent time for generating the required number of chaﬀ points irrespective of the number of genuine minutiae
points. Discussed below are the baseline Nguyen algorithm and the proposed chaﬀ generation algorithm.
A fingerprint image is divided into m × n image cells, where m represents the number of rows and n
represents the number of columns. Each image cell is of size w × w . Each image cell would either contain a
unique genuine minutiae point or a chaﬀ point or will remain empty. The image cell is addressed as (xcel l , ycel l ),
where xcel l ∈ [0, 1, 2....m] and y cel l ∈ [0, 1, 2....n]. The pixel inside an image cell is addressed as (xorder , yorder ),
where xorder ∈ [0, 1, 2....w − 1] and yorder ∈ [0, 1, 2....w − 1].
3.1. Nguyen’s chaﬀ generation algorithm
Nguyen’s approach [6,22] makes use of the three-dimensional user data type ImagecellData to monitor image cells
containing minutiae points or chaﬀ points, x-y coordinates of the points, and the orientation θ . A NeighborList
set containing minutiae or chaﬀ points in eight adjacent image cells is also formed.
Nguyen’s algorithm: chaﬀ point generation
r

1. Generate a set SMT {mj }j=1 of genuine minutiae m = (x, y, θ) extracted from a fingerprint where x, y
are coordinate values and θ is orientation.
2. Update ImagecellData using SMT to monitor the location of the genuine minutiae points.
if (image cell contains genuine minutiae or chaﬀ)
set first element of ImagecellData as 1 and other two elements as the value of x and y coordinate,
respectively
else
set first element of ImagecellData as 0 and other two elements as NULL
3. Repeat steps from 4 to 8 until ECM (encoded chaﬀ minutiae) set has ‘s’ members.
4. Randomly generate an empty image cell (xcell , ycell ).
5. Generate an order (xorder , yorder ) within (xcell , ycell ) and calculate actual coordinates (ux ,vx ,θx ) .
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6. Obtain and add the points belonging to eight adjacent neighborhoods of image cell (xcell , ycell ) to
NeighborList.
if (NeighborList is empty)
add (ux , vx , θx ) to CM (set of chaﬀ points) and update (x, y) in ImagecellData
else
calculate Euclidian distance between (x, y) and points in NeighborList
7. if (Euclidean distance > threshold)
add (ux , vx , θx ) to CM and update (x, y) in ImagecellData
8. Encode the chaﬀ points in

{

}
F = GF (216 ) and add the encoded point to the ECM set.

3.2. Proposed chaﬀ generation algorithm
In the proposed chaﬀ generation algorithm two ArrayList sets, namely Used and Free, are maintained. Used
ArrayList stores image cells containing genuine minutiae or chaﬀ points while Free ArrayList stores image
cells that do not contain any genuine minutiae or chaﬀ points. Initially Used ArrayList will store image cells
containing only genuine minutiae points. All other remaining image cells stored in Free ArrayList are shuﬄed
once for generating randomness. In the proposed chaﬀ generation algorithm, a new chaﬀ point is generated
by considering a window around the candidate chaﬀ point, which is randomly generated within an image cell
selected from Free ArrayList. If no other point (genuine minutiae point or chaﬀ point) lies inside the considered
window, then the candidate chaﬀ point is considered as a valid chaﬀ point or otherwise discarded. Chaﬀ points
are inserted according to algorithm described below and illustrated in Figure 2.
Proposed algorithm: chaﬀ point generation
1. Repeat steps 2 to 6 until ‘n’ chaﬀ points are generated.
2. Take image cell IC (xcel l , ycel l ) from Free Arraylist and remove it from there.
3. Randomly generate order (xorder yorder ) within IC (xcel l , ycel l ) and calculate its actual coordinates P (x, y)
using Eqs. (1) and (2).
x = xcell × w+ xorder

(1)

y = ycell ×w+ yorder

(2)

P (x, y) can be considered as a candidate chaﬀ point.
′

4. Consider a window W centered at P (x, y) of same size (w × w) as that of the image cell and calculate
the four boundary points (B1 , B2 , B3 , B4 ) using Eqs. (3) to (6).
B1 (x, y) = (P (x) − w/2, P (y) − w/2)
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Figure 2. Illustration of proposed chaﬀ point generation.

B2 (x, y) = (P (x) − w/2, P (y) + w/2)

(4)

B3 (x, y) = (P (x) + w/2, P (y) − w/2)

(5)

B4 (x, y) = (P (x) + w/2, P (y) + w/2)

(6)

5. for i = 1 to 4
( ′
)
′
′
IC xcell , ycell = Bi (x/w, y/w)
if ( IC

′

(

)
′
′
xcell , ycell = IC (xcell ,ycell ))

continue
else
if (IC

′

(

′

′

xcell , ycell
(

Obtain

′

)
exists in Used Arraylist)
′

xorder , yorder

)
from Used Arraylist

( ′
)
′
′
if ( xorder , yorder falls inside W )
Add IC (xcell ,ycell ) to Free Arraylist
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go to step 2
else
continue
else
continue
P (x, y) is now considered as a valid chaﬀ point.
6. Add P (x, y) to Used Arraylist.
4. Results and analysis
The performance of the proposed algorithm is analyzed using standard FVC 2002 and a live fingerprint database
acquired using the Verifier 300LC fingerprint scanner and Mega Matcher SDK 4.0 at a resolution of 500 dpi.
The database consists of fingerprint samples of 100 users with 2 fingerprint impressions of the same finger for
′

each user. The size of the fingerprint samples is 388 × 374. Size of the image cell and window W is considered
as 9 × 9. The proposed methodology is stimulated using MATLAB version 2015a running on an HP laptop
with the Microsoft Windows 8.1 system having processor configurations as Intel Core i5-5200U CPU @ 2.20
GHz and 64-bit operating system. In order to have a fair comparison, all the chaﬀ generation algorithms have
been tested on this same hardware platform.
4.1. Functionality analysis
The number of chaﬀ points added is ten times the genuine minutiae points. The performance of the proposed
chaﬀ generation algorithm is compared with the existing chaﬀ point generation approaches of Clancy et al. [5],
Khalil-Hani et al. [8,21], Nguyen et al. [6], and Hooda and Kaur [23]. Functionality analysis is performed in
terms of time taken and number of candidate chaﬀ points generated for adding the required number of chaﬀ
points.
4.1.1. Analysis on the basis of chaﬀ point generation time
The average execution time comparison to generate the required number of chaﬀ points using Clancy’s, Khalil’s,
Nguyen’s, Hooda’s, and the proposed chaﬀ point generation algorithm is graphically shown in Figure 3.
Chaff points generation
time (ms)

10000.0

Clancy

1000.0

Khalil

100.0

Nguyen

10.0

Hooda

1.0
0.1
110 130 150 170 190 210 230 250 270 290 310

Proposed

Number of Chaff Points
Figure 3. Execution time comparison of generating chaﬀ points.

Clancy et al. [5] make use of the Euclidean distance to validate the chaﬀ points depending on the
threshold of minimum distance. It computes the Euclidean distance between a candidate chaﬀ point and all
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other existing points in the vault. Clancy’s chaﬀ point generation approach takes less time as compared to the
proposed chaﬀ point generation algorithm for generating less than 130 chaﬀ points. This is because initially
the number of existing points in the vault is lower and therefore the Euclidean distance needs to be computed
comparatively fewer times. However, as the number of chaﬀ points needed in the vault increases, time to
compute the Euclidean distance with all the existing points also increases linearly. Thus, Clancy’s approach
takes more time while generating large numbers of chaﬀ points and it fails to generate the required number of
chaﬀ points (ten times the genuine minutiae points) for the genuine minutiae points above 30. In the proposed
chaﬀ point generation algorithm, instead of computing Euclidean distance, uniform steps (considering a window
and comparing candidate points with boundary points) are to be performed for each chaﬀ point generation.
This process takes less time in generating large numbers of chaﬀ points while taking more time for generating
less than 130 chaﬀ points as compared to Clancy’s approach.
The chaﬀ generation approach of Khalil-Hani et al. [8,21] makes use of the circle packing scheme, which
takes more time for generating chaﬀ points as compared to the proposed chaﬀ point generation algorithm. This
is because in order to generate a chaﬀ point in Khalil-Hani’s chaﬀ generation approach, it needs to check that
the new point’s boundary is not overlapping with any other existing point’s boundary. In the proposed chaﬀ
generation algorithm, the candidate chaﬀ point is at most compared with only the four boundary points of the
window formed by considering the candidate chaﬀ point as the center.
The chaﬀ generation approach of Nguyen et al. [6] splits a fingerprint image into image cells. Chaﬀ
points are randomly generated, which must be unique points in an image cell, and the distance between the
new point and the existing points in the eight adjacent image cells is greater than or equal to the threshold.
Initially while generating chaﬀ points, the probability of randomly choosing a unique point in an image cell is
more. Thus, Nguyen’s approach takes less time while generating chaﬀ points for less than 21 genuine minutiae
points. However, as the required number of chaﬀ point increases, the probability of randomly choosing a unique
point in an image cell decreases, causing it to repeatedly choose the image cell already containing the genuine
minutiae point or a chaﬀ point. Hence, in Nguyen’s algorithm chaﬀ point generation time increases as the
required number of chaﬀ points increases. In the proposed algorithm, separate lists are maintained for storing
free and used image cells and therefore it takes a consistent time for generating the required number of chaﬀ
points irrespective of the number of genuine minutiae points.
Hooda and Kaur [23] use an axis diﬀerence to place a chaﬀ point. While generating more than 210 chaﬀ
points, it takes more time as compared to the proposed algorithm as it needs to compute the axis diﬀerence
between the candidate chaﬀ point and all other existing points in the vault. Initially it takes less time as the
total number of points in the vault is lower.
4.1.2. Analysis on the basis of number of candidate chaﬀ points
The candidate chaﬀ point is the randomly selected point that can be considered as the valid chaﬀ point only
if it meets certain predefined criteria. The total number of candidate chaﬀ points generated using Clancy’s,
Khalil’s, Nguyen’s, Hooda’s, and the proposed chaﬀ point generation algorithm is graphically shown in Figure
4. There is variation in the number of candidate chaﬀ points because of the diﬀerent underlying chaﬀ generation
algorithms being used. This variation in the number of candidate chaﬀ points leads to the diﬀerence in the
execution times in spite of the fact that the number of valid chaﬀ points being generated is the same for all
approaches. In the proposed algorithm, the total number of candidate chaﬀ points generated is less as compared
to the existing chaﬀ point generation methods because a separate list is maintained for storing free image cells
in which chaﬀ points can be generated and used image cells that already contain a genuine minutiae point or
4729
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the chaﬀ point. Therefore, it eliminates the possibility of choosing the image cell that is already filled with a
genuine minutiae point or a chaﬀ point and thus it generates fewer candidate chaﬀ points. For generating 290
chaﬀ points, the number of candidate chaﬀ points generated in the proposed chaﬀ point generation algorithm
is 301, which is 216.6, 221.7, 5.1, and 3.1 times less than in Clancy’s, Khalil’s, Nguyen’s, and Hooda’s chaﬀ
generation approach, respectively.
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Figure 4. Comparison of number of generated candidate chaﬀ points.

4.2. Performance analysis
The fuzzy vault system using the proposed chaﬀ point generation algorithm is implemented using a key size of
128 bits with an 8th-degree polynomial. The performance of the fuzzy vault scheme using the proposed chaﬀ
point generation algorithm is evaluated using the false rejection rate (FRR) and false acceptance rate (FAR).
For calculating the FRR, the first fingerprint impression of each user from the created database is considered as
the template sample and the second fingerprint impression is considered as the query sample. The total number
of genuine attempts is 100. For calculating the FAR, the first fingerprint impression of a particular user and all
the other users are considered as the template and query sample, respectively. The total number of imposter
attempts is 9900. For the proposed methodology, FRR and FAR are found to be 10% and 0.05%, respectively.
4.3. Security analysis
The proposed chaﬀ point generation algorithm could resist the attack described by Chang et al. [25]. In this
attack, an attacker can identify genuine minutiae points by applying brute force attack to measure the free
space around the point, known as the ‘degree of freedom’ of all existing points in the vault, in order to eliminate
chaﬀ points. While generating a larger number of chaﬀ points, an attacker may easily identify chaﬀ points that
are generated later as they have comparatively smaller degrees of freedom. The proposed approach modifies
Nguyen’s chaﬀ point generation algorithm; however, it splits the fingerprint image into equally sized segments
called image cells and the valid chaﬀ point in an image cell would be unique. Thus, degrees of freedom would
not be aﬀected by the order of the generated chaﬀ points and the attacker could not distinguish between genuine
minutiae points and chaﬀ points, as was experimentally proven by Nguyen et al. [22].
Security of a fuzzy vault scheme based on the complexity to reconstruct the polynomial is analyzed
using the min-entropy method [26]. The min-entropy of the minutiae template MT given vault V under the
assumption of uniform minutiae distribution is computed using Eq. (7).
((
H∞ (M |V ) = −log2
T
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Here, r denotes the number of minutiae points, n denotes the degree of the polynomial, and s denotes the number
of chaﬀ points. Consider the values of r, n, and s to be 21, 8, and 210, respectively. The total number of possible
combinations is 4.4077 × 1015 , but in order to decode the secret successfully, it needs 293,930 combinations.
Hence, for an attacker, it would need 6.6 × 10−11 evaluations to decode the secret. On the basis of this analysis,
the security of the proposed vault is approximately 34 bits.
The security of the fuzzy vault can be increased by increasing the degree of the polynomial and key size,
making it hard to reconstruct the polynomial as shown in the Table. It can be concluded that with the increase
in the degree of the polynomial, the probability of decoding the secret is decreasing and the overall security of
the biometric system in terms of entropy is increasing, making the system harder to break by brute force attack.
However, there is a strong trade-oﬀ between security and complexity in the biometric system. As the security
increases, the computational complexity of the system also increases, which will lead to an increase in overall
fuzzy vault encoding and decoding time. The choice of degree is strongly application-dependent. However,
for implementing a fuzzy vault system in real-time scenarios, the proposed fuzzy vault system with degree 8
achieves adequate security.
Table. Entropy values by varying polynomial degree.

Degree of
polynomial
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Fuzzy vault
key size
(in bits)
128
144
160
176
192
208
224
240

Total number
of possible
combinations
4.4077 × 1015
9.7852 × 1016
1.9659 × 1018
3.6042 × 1019
6.0717 × 1020
9.4545 × 1021
1.3677 × 1023
1.8464 × 1024

Combinations
to decode
the secret
2.9 × 105
3.5 × 105
3.5 × 105
2.9 × 105
2 × 105
1.1 × 105
5.1 × 104
2 × 104

Probability
of decoding
the secret
6.6 × 10−11
3.6 × 10−12
1.8 × 10−13
8.1 × 10−15
3.3 × 10−16
1.22 × 10−17
3.9 × 10−19
1.1 × 10−20

Entropy
(in bits)
34
38
42
47
51
56
61
66

5. Conclusion
This paper proposes a neoteric method for chaﬀ point generation in fingerprint fuzzy vaults. Results show that
the proposed algorithm takes consistent time for generating the required number of chaﬀ points irrespective of
the number of genuine minutiae points and generates fewer candidate chaﬀ points as compared to Clancy’s,
Khalil’s, Nguyen’s, and Hooda’s chaﬀ generation algorithms. The FRR and FAR of the fuzzy vault system are
evaluated to be 10% and 0.05%, respectively, which shows that the fingerprint fuzzy vault with proposed chaﬀ
generation algorithm achieves acceptable performance.
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